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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1388 
 ___________ 
 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
 NEAL MOSES,  
              Appellant 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Criminal No. 2-00-cr-00454-001) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Robert F. Kelly 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
                           June 22, 2012 
 
 Before:  JORDAN, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed: June 22, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Neal Moses, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals a District Court order 
that denied his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce his sentence.  We will affirm.1
                                                 
1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because the District Court’s decision 
was based on legal analysis and not the exercise of its discretion, we review it de novo.  
 
2 
 
 At the time Moses was sentenced,2 the penalties under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1) for the 
quantity of crack involved in his offense set a mandatory twenty-year minimum sentence 
for violators with “a prior conviction for a felony drug offense.”  See
 Several years after Moses was sentenced, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act 
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).  Section 2 of the Act amended the 
relevant subsection of 21 U.S.C. § 841, 
 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1) (2001).  The District Court docket reflects that the matter of Moses’s prior 
offense was submitted to the jury, which found it to satisfy the requirements of 
§ 841(b)(1).  Accordingly, the twenty-year concurrent sentences Moses received reflected 
the minimum possible term to which he could be sentenced. 
see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2012), and led 
to the promulgation of sentencing guidelines reflecting the new statutory scheme.  See 
United States v. Dixon
 Both below and on appeal, Moses argues that he should benefit from these revised 
guidelines (and specifically Amendment 750), which he alleges to have lowered the 
range applicable to his conduct.  But as he concedes on page six of his brief, we held in 
, 648 F.3d 195, 197–98 (3d Cir. 2011). 
United States v. Reevey
                                                                                                                                                             
See United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 277 (3d Cir. 2009), overruled on other 
grounds as stated in United States v. Carrigan, 446 F. App’x 392, 393 (3d Cir. 2011).  As 
the parties are our primary audience, we will forgo a lengthy factual recitation. 
, 631 F.3d 110 (3d Cir. 2010), that the revised statutory terms of 
 
2 See generally United States v. Moses, 58 F. App’x 549 (3d Cir. 2003) (direct appeal); 
United States v. Moses, Criminal Action No. 00-454, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12867 (E.D. 
Pa. June 30, 2005), certificate of appealability denied, C.A. No. 05-3531 (order entered 
Mar. 14, 2006) (collateral attack). 
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incarceration were not to be retroactively applicable to persons, such as Moses, whose 
sentencing took place before the statute was enacted.  Id. at 114–15.  Moses urges us to 
overrule Reevey, which he claims to “overlook[] the intent of Congress.”  We decline to 
do so.  First, in the Third Circuit, en banc consideration is required to overrule the 
precedent of a prior Panel.  See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1; In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 
F.3d 261, 274 (3d Cir. 2005).  Second, and on a substantive basis, our opinion in Reevey 
was in harmony with the “decision[s] of every Court of Appeals to have addressed th[e] 
issue” at that time.  Id.
The District Court, applying the rule we announced in 
 at 115 (collecting cases). 
Reevey, correctly held that 
“the original mandatory minimum penalty of 240 months remain[ed] applicable” to 
Moses, forestalling modification of his sentence.  United States v. Moses
  
, Criminal 
Action No. 00-454, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10029, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2012).  As we 
are in full accord, we will affirm its order. 
